fix: drives

backend/src/drives.py

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ async def upload_file(user_id, drive_name, filename, stream, mime_type=None):
         drive = await db.Drive.create(user_id=user_id, name=drive_name)
 
     # Check collision
-    if await db.Drive.get_or_none(drive_id=drive.id, filename=filename):
+    if await db.DriveFile.get_or_none(drive_id=drive.id, filename=filename):
         raise Exception("Duplicated file")
     
     # 2. Prepare disk path
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ async def delete_file(file_id):
     return abs_path
 
 async def resolve_file(user_id, drive_name, filename):
-    """Resolve file to absolute disk path after permission check. Returns (path, mime)."""
+    """Resolve file to absolute disk path after permission check. Returns (abs_path, file.id)."""
     # Eager load drive and verify ownership
     drive = await db.Drive.get_or_none(user_id=user_id, name=drive_name)
     if drive.user_id != user_id:

backend/src/server/websocket.py

@@ -68,14 +68,54 @@ def register(server, app, auth_manager):
             stop_listening = app.on_event(on_event)
 
             while True:
-                req = json.loads(await websocket.receive())
-                if not 'action' in req:
+                asyncio.create_task(handle_request(
+                    app, user_id, session_connections, send, await websocket.receive()
+                ))
+
+        finally:
+            print("User logged out:", user_id)
+            sender_task.cancel()
+            if ws_task in app.ws_tasks:
+                app.ws_tasks.remove(ws_task)
+            # Unregister the event listener: the send closure would
+            # otherwise keep queueing events for a dead socket forever
+            if stop_listening:
+                stop_listening()
+            # All remotes served by this session are disconnected with it.
+            # disconnectRemote is idempotent, so remotes that were already
+            # disconnected manually (possibly from another session) are safe.
+            for remotename in list(session_connections):
+                app.disconnectRemote(user_id, remotename)
+            app.remove_user_connection(user_id, send_queue)
+
+# Error handling
+async def handle_request(app, user_id, session_connections, send, req):
+    try:
+        req = json.loads(req)
+        await process_request(app, user_id, session_connections, send, req)
+
+    except Exception as err:
+        action = req.get('action') if isinstance(req, dict) else None
+        nonce  = req.get('nonce') if isinstance(req, dict) else None
+
+        # Maintainers
+        print(f"[ws] req error @{user_id} {action!r}: {err!r}")
+        print(traceback.format_exc())
+        # Client — nonce makes this routable to the caller's promise/callback
+        try:
+            await send({'error': str(err), 'nonce': nonce})
+        except Exception:
+            print(traceback.format_exc())
+
+# Actual processing
+async def process_request(app, user_id, session_connections, send, req):
+    if 'action' not in req:
         await send({'error': 'no action'})
-                    continue
+        return
     action = req['action']
     body = req.get('body', {})
     nonce = req.get('nonce', None)
-                print(f"[ws] action @{user_id} {action}")
+    print(f"[ws] req @{user_id} {action}")
 
     async def agent_id_from_body (allow_none=False):
         if 'agentId' in body:
@@ -88,7 +128,7 @@ def register(server, app, auth_manager):
             raise Exception("field 'agentId' or 'agentname' required")
 
     if action == "ping":
-                    await send({'message': "pong"})
+        await send({'message': "pong", 'nonce': nonce})
 
     elif action == "create-agent":
         name = body['name']
@@ -300,7 +340,7 @@ def register(server, app, auth_manager):
     elif action == "prompt-agent":
         if 'instruction' not in body and 'input' not in body:
             await send({'error': "instruction or input required", 'nonce': nonce})
-                        continue
+            return
 
         # Multiple-result action, same shape as read-stream: every
         # generated message is its own packet carrying the request
@@ -337,18 +377,3 @@ def register(server, app, auth_manager):
 
     else:
         await send({'error': 'unknown action: ' + action, 'nonce': nonce})
-        finally:
-            print("User logged out:", user_id)
-            sender_task.cancel()
-            if ws_task in app.ws_tasks:
-                app.ws_tasks.remove(ws_task)
-            # Unregister the event listener: the send closure would
-            # otherwise keep queueing events for a dead socket forever
-            if stop_listening:
-                stop_listening()
-            # All remotes served by this session are disconnected with it.
-            # disconnectRemote is idempotent, so remotes that were already
-            # disconnected manually (possibly from another session) are safe.
-            for remotename in list(session_connections):
-                app.disconnectRemote(user_id, remotename)
-            app.remove_user_connection(user_id, send_queue)

docs/drives.md

@@ -1,27 +1,29 @@
 # Drives
 
-Per-user file storage: a **drive** is a named container owned by a user, and each **file** is a database record plus a blob on disk. Everything is addressed by *drive name + filename* — the random file id never appears in URLs. Drives bypass the WebSocket action protocol entirely: all endpoints are plain REST (routes in `backend/src/server/web.py`, logic in `backend/src/drives.py`), so downloads can be plain `<a>` links.
+Per-user file storage: a **drive** is a named container owned by a user, and each **file** is a database record plus a blob on disk. Client-facing routes are addressed by *drive name + filename* — the random file id never appears in URLs — though several `drives.py` helpers below are id-addressed internally. Drives bypass the WebSocket action protocol entirely: all endpoints are plain REST (routes in `backend/src/server/web.py`, logic in `backend/src/drives.py`), so downloads can be plain `<a>` links.
 
 ## Logical model
 
 - **Drive** — user-scoped, addressed by name. Created implicitly on first upload to a new name; there is no create/rename/delete-drive endpoint.
 - **File** — readable `filename`, mime type, size, `created`/`accessed` timestamps.
 - **Folders are virtual** — a filename may contain slashes (`docs/api/readme.md`); the Drives view splits names to render a tree, but storage stays flat.
-- **Identity** — `DriveFile.id` is a random hex string (`secrets.token_hex(8)`) that doubles as the on-disk filename, so user-facing names never touch the filesystem.
+- **Identity** — `DriveFile.id` is a random hex string (`secrets.token_hex(8)`, 16 hex chars) that doubles as the on-disk filename, so user-facing names never touch the filesystem.
 
 ## Backend interface
 
 Download links can't set headers, so the GET/DELETE file routes additionally accept the token as a `?token=` query parameter.
 
+Client-facing file routes are drive+filename-addressed, but the `drives.py` helpers behind them are mixed: `upload_file` accepts drive+filename directly, while `get_metadata(file_id)` and `delete_file(file_id)` are id-addressed, so their routes must first resolve filename → id (via the drive's file records) before calling them. The two listing routes are not implemented in `drives.py` at all — their logic lives elsewhere.
+
 | Route | Behavior |
 | --- | --- |
-| `GET /files` | List the user's drives: `[{id, name}]` |
-| `GET /files/<drive>` | List files: `[{id, name, size, mime, created}]` |
+| `GET /files` | List the user's drives: `[{id, name}]`. Not implemented in `drives.py`. |
+| `GET /files/<drive>` | List files: `[{id, name, size, mime, created}]`. Not implemented in `drives.py`. |
 | `POST /files/<drive>/<filename>` | Multipart upload (field `file`) in a single request. The URL tail — `<path:filename>`, slashes allowed — becomes the stored filename; the part's own name is the fallback. Returns `{fileId}`. |
-| `GET /files/<drive>/<filename>` | Serve the bytes with their stored mime type, or return `{id, name, size, mime, created, accessed}` when `?metadata` is present. |
-| `DELETE /files/<drive>/<filename>` | Delete the record, then the blob. Returns `{fileId}`. |
+| `GET /files/<drive>/<filename>` | Serve the bytes, with the mime type looked up from the file record (not from `resolve_file`), or return `{id, name, size, mime, created, accessed}` when `?metadata` is present. |
+| `DELETE /files/<drive>/<filename>` | Delete the record, then the blob. Returns the removed absolute disk path (`abs_path`). |
 
-Every resolve (download, metadata, delete) stamps `accessed_at`.
+Only `resolve_file` stamps `accessed_at`; `get_metadata` and `delete_file` never touch it.
 
 ## Frontend interface
 
@@ -29,20 +31,20 @@ In `frontend/src/backend.js`:
 
 - `webFetch(path, options)` — generic REST helper: sets `Authorization: Bearer` (waiting for login if needed), parses JSON, throws on non-2xx. Downloads bypass it.
 - `getDrives()`, `getDriveFiles(driveName)`, `deleteDriveFile(driveName, filename)`
-- `uploadDriveFile(driveName, file)` — multipart POST of the whole file.
+- `uploadDriveFile(driveName, file, path)` — multipart-POSTs the whole file to `/files/<driveName>/<path>`, where `path` is the destination filename including any virtual folder prefix (`docs/api/readme.md`). The composite path belongs in the URL, since the upload route only exists at `/files/<drive>/<path:filename>`.
 - `driveFileUrl(driveName, filename)` — GET URL carrying `?token=`, used for download anchors and for opening a file in a tab.
 
-`frontend/src/views/Drives.vue` lazy-loads a drive's files on first expand, rebuilds the folder tree from the flat file list on every load (open folders live on the drive object, so they survive reloads), uploads through a file picker, and deletes with confirmation.
+`frontend/src/views/Drives.vue` lazy-loads a drive's files on first expand, rebuilds the folder tree from the flat file list on every load (open folders live on the drive object, so they survive reloads), uploads through a file picker (building the target path from the picked folder and passing it as `uploadDriveFile`'s third argument), and deletes with confirmation.
 
 ## Implementation notes
 
-- Models in `backend/src/database.py` (migration `0002_auto_20260921_1840`): `Drive(id, user_id, name, created_at)` and `DriveFile(id char(64) pk, drive_id, filename, mime_type, size_bytes, accessed_at, created_at)`, table `drive_files`. Ownership rides the `User → Drive → File` chain and is checked before any disk access.
+- Models in `backend/src/database.py` (migration `0002_auto_20260921_1840`): `Drive(id, user_id, name, created_at)` and `DriveFile(id, drive_id, filename, mime_type, size_bytes, accessed_at, created_at)`, table `drive_files`. The `id` is a 16-char hex string, not `char(64)`. Ownership rides the `User → Drive → File` chain; it is checked in `resolve_file` before disk access, but `delete_file` and `get_metadata` take a bare `file_id` and perform no ownership check of their own — their routes must guard them.
 - Disk layout: `{data_dir}/drives/{drive_id}/{file_id}` — keyed by drive id, not by user or name. `init_drives(data_directory)`, called from `main()`, creates the root.
 - Upload streams to disk in 8 KiB chunks and only then writes the DB record; delete removes the record first, then the blob.
 
 ## Known issues
 
-- `uploadDriveFile` POSTs to `/files/<drive>`, where no POST route exists, and drops the folder-path argument `Drives.vue` passes it — UI uploads fail, and folder-targeted upload is not wired up.
 - Drives are only created implicitly, and the view only uploads into existing drives, so the first drive cannot be created from the frontend.
 - Uploads are meant to refuse a filename already used in the drive, but the check queries the `Drive` model with `DriveFile`'s fields, so it errors instead of detecting duplicates.
 - `resolve_file` dereferences the drive without a None check, so a nonexistent drive yields a 500 instead of a 404.
+- `delete_file` and `get_metadata` take a bare `file_id` with no ownership check; if their routes don't resolve and authorize the file against the owning user, any authenticated user could delete or inspect another user's file by id.

frontend/src/backend.js

@@ -379,6 +379,8 @@ export function invalidateCache({ chats=false, agents=false } = {}) {
 // Drive endpoints are plain HTTP routes instead of WebSocket actions,
 // so they authenticate with the bearer token in the Authorization header.
 
+// TODO: Next time these functions need updating, move them directly to views/Drives.vue
+
 export function getDrives () {
   return webFetch('/files');
 }
@@ -387,10 +389,10 @@ export function getDriveFiles (driveName) {
   return webFetch(`/files/${driveName}`);
 }
 
-export function uploadDriveFile (driveName, file) {
+export function uploadDriveFile (driveName, file, path) {
   const body = new FormData();
   body.append('file', file, file.name);
-  return webFetch(`/files/${driveName}`, {
+  return webFetch(`/files/${driveName}/${path}`, {
     method: 'POST',
     body,
   });